Edited by Michael Böss,
Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning

Developing
Democracies

*Democracy, Democratization,
and Development*

Developing Democracies

Developing Democracies

Democracy, Democratization, and Development

Edited by
Michael Böss, Jørgen Møller, and Svend-Erik Skaaning

AARHUS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Weblinks were active when the book was printed. They may no longer be active

Contents

PART 1 · CONCEPTUALIZING, MEASURING, AND EXPLAINING DEMOCRACY

PART 2 · DEMOCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

PART 3 · REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL

■ General Introduction: The Crooked Roads of Democratization

Michael Böss

In 2010, when I began contacting potential speakers for the following year's international MatchPoints Seminar at Aarhus University – on 'Democracy, Democratization and Development' – no one yet had the faintest idea of the series of events which would unfold in the Arab world only a year later, and which would add a significance to the seminar which I as its convener had not even dreamed of.

By then, what the international media had been quick to hail as the 'Arab Spring', some academics had already begun to compare with the equally dramatic and unforeseen 'third wave' of democratization after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Others were reluctant to proclaim the events in Tunisia and Egypt as evidence of a fourth wave of democratization. Francis Fukuyama, in his final year as Distinguished Visiting Professor at Aarhus, opened the seminar with notes of hope: the revolutions should indeed be seen as a sign of hope and change in societies that had been suffering under authoritarian regimes and which the West, due to the fact that political Islam had so far appeared to be the only alternative, had long been regarded as unsusceptible to liberal democracy.

The events in the Middle East since 2011 do confirm that this part of the world is not 'immune' to democracy, as many observers have long claimed. However, history doesn't move in a linear way. The Arab Spring did lead to the removal of authoritarian governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, but it is still difficult to predict the final outcome. Developments since May 2011 give reasons for caution. Tunisia and Libya still have a long way to go towards a democratic order, and hopes for the introduction of liberal democracy in Egypt have been fading since the election of Mohammad Morsi, the presidential candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially after Morsi broke ranks with the revolutionary movement with a special decree that enhanced his own powers and secured the passing of a constitution which was based on sharia law, discriminated against religious minorities and secularists, and didn't protect the basic rights of citizens. When it passed by referendum in December 2012, Egypt seemed just to have replaced 'one-man-tyranny' with 'democratic dictatorship', thus confirming Fareed Zakaria's critique of 'illiberal

7

democracy', which he voiced in his bestselling book from 2003 – and which he also rehearsed at the Aarhus seminar.[1] In other words: Revolutions have not proved enough. Nor have elections. What will matter for democratization in the long run is institution building: democratic constitutions, the rule of law, the formation of political parties, an independent system of justice, democratic accountability, an uncorrupt civil service, and a well-functioning state system.

Interviewed by the British newspaper *The Guardian* on his way back from the Aarhus seminar – promoting the first volume of his recent analysis of the "origins of political order" – Francis Fukuyama aired further somber concerns about the future of democracy. In Russia, Asia, and even in the West there were serious "blips" and dark clouds gathering. "Nothing good" had happened in Russia since Putin came to power, and China was a "really interesting challenge" due to its "very high-quality authoritarian government." In addition, there was reason to be concerned with the challenges posed by globalization: in Europe, the immigration of Muslims was controversial and therefore giving rise to political populism. At the same time, economic globalization was putting pressure on welfare systems: a lot of developed democracies would have to "renegotiate their basic social contract, because a lot of the welfare state arrangements are just not sustainable, and that's something democracies are really not good at."[2]

Also in the United States, democracy had come under pressure from a globalized capitalism. Increasing economic inequality was threatening to erode the middle-class base of liberal democracy. At the Aarhus seminar, Fukuyama discussed the unhappy consequences of congressional gridlock since the election of President Obama for voter confidence in the political system. In a later article in *Foreign Affairs*, Fukuyama deplored the lack of a left-wing "counter-narrative" to balance the right-wing populism of the Tea Party movement. Such a narrative would have to begin with "a critique of the elites that allowed the benefit of the many to be sacrificed to that of the few and a critique of the money politics, especially in Washington, that overwhelmingly benefits the wealthy."[3]

Similarly, Charles A. Kupchan, in the same issue of *Foreign Affairs*, diagnosed a "democratic malaise", again as a side-product of globalization. As he elaborated in his new book, *No One's World*, a "crisis of governability" has at present engulfed advanced democracies, and has led to political breakdowns and stalemates

---

1. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: Norton, 2003).
2. "Francis Fukuyama: 'Americans are not very good at nation-building,'" *Guardian*, May 23, 2011. Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).
3. "The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?", *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2012). See also Francis Fukuyama, "Dealing with Inequality," in *Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy*, ed. Francis Fukuyama, Larry Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), 3-13. The article first appeared in the July 2011 issue of the *Journal of Democracy*.

in Europe, the United States, and Japan. Globalization is producing ever widening gaps between "what electorates are asking of their governments and what those governments are able to deliver," and this mismatch between the growing demand for good governance and shrinking supply is "one of the gravest challenges facing the Western world today."[4] Popular unrest, the rise of extreme right-wing parties and the replacement of democratic by technocratic governments in Southern Europe in the wake of the eurocrisis have given some credence to this perception.

Other observers have been noting an increasing number of "dissatisfied democrats"[5] and "critical citizens"[6] in both advanced and new democracies. Drawing on David Easton's parameters of gauging political support,[7] Norris and her collaborators concluded in 1999 that these citizens were not "critical" in the sense of rejecting democratic ideals and democracy as a system of government, however, but were convinced democrats who were losing confidence in politicians and the way in which core institutions of representative government – political parties, parliaments, and governments – were working and being run by the political elites. Re-visiting this thesis 12 years later, Norris re-confirmed these observations: contrary to the prevalent view, evidence gathered from a huge set of data demonstrates that support for democracy as a political system has not eroded across a wide range of countries around the world, including established democracies in the United States and Western Europe. However, Norris warns against the potential consequences of growing 'democratic deficit': "In many countries today, satisfaction with the performance of democracy diverges from public aspirations."[8] It is the gap between aspirations and satisfaction that is captured by the concept of 'democratic deficit'. The concept was originally used about the perceived gap between the decision-making processes of the EU and the democratic standards of European nation-states, but is now generally applied to any instance where perceived democratic performance falls short of public expectations.[9] Norris admits of multiple explanatory causes of democratic deficit, but concludes that the most plausible potential explanation suggests that it arises from a combination of "growing public expectations, negative views, and/or failing government performance," and she warns against taking this development

_____

4.   Charles A. Kupchan, "The Democratic Malaise: Globalization and the Threat to the West," *Foreign Affairs*, (January/February 2012); Charles A. Kupchan, *No One's World: The West, the Rising West and the Coming Global Turn* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

5.   Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

6.   Pippa Norris (ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

7.   David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965).

8.   Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4.

9.   See, for example, Mark E. Warren, "Citizen Representatives," in *Designing Deliberative Democracy*, ed. Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 50-69.

lightly: "[T]he democratic deficit has important consequences – including for political activism, for allegiant forms of political behavior and rule of law, and ultimately for processes of democratization."[10]

In "post-democracy" or "managed democracy," citizens feel excluded from democratic participation, and rightly so, claim Colin Crouch and Sheldon Wolin. For political decisions are today increasingly made in close circles made up of professional politicians, so-called experts, civil servants and CEOs of the corporate world.[11] Feeling disconnected and alienated from national democratic processes, dissatisfied democrats call for electoral reform in terms of referendums and other forms of direct democracy.[12] On their part, theorists of democratic renewal suggest the greater use of deliberative institutions and processes.[13] Or discuss the potentials of re-considering the criteria for political representation.[14] Or other means of engaging and activating citizens, not least young people, in democracy.[15]

The purpose of the present volume is to address some of these concerns and ideas for ways to deal with what is perhaps not yet the "crisis of democracy" that Huntington feared in 1975,[16] but which is certainly in need of attention. Democratization and democracy promotion became subjects of research in the 1990s, especially after Samuel Huntington identified a "third wave".[17] Although there is still wide agreement that democracy is the only viable legitimation principle in modern societies, it appears to be facilitated, if not determined, by certain socio-economic structures. When these structures are transformed, the power of attraction of democratic ideas may weaken; less so in old democracies, however, than in the new ones of the developing world. Even though the former Washington consensus on development has declined, and the World Bank has now converted to a wholehearted recommendation of democratization as the best strategy for economic development. Democracy may not be seen as the best model for economic growth and development in developing countries, as it often is in the present when

---

10. *Democratic Deficit*, 7, 8.
11. Colin Crouch, *Post-Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); Sheldon S. Wolin, *Democracy Inc.: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
12. Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices*, 184. See also William Cross (ed.), *Democratic Reform in New Brunswick* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2007).
13. See, for example, James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett (eds.), *Debating Deliberative Democracy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) and Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse (eds.), *Designing Deliberative Democracy*.
14. Jane Mansbridge, "A 'Selection Model' of Political Representation," *Journal of Political Philosophy* 17, no. 4 (December 2009): 369-398.
15. For an overview of proactive approaches, see Joan DeBarclelében and Jon H. Pammett, *Activating the Citizen: Dilemmas of Participation in Europe and Canada* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
16. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper," *Public Interest* 41 (1975): 9-38.
17. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).